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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal by the defendant, Wilbur J. Stites,
from a verdict and judgment entered in the District Court
for Cache County, State of Utah, finding and adjudging the
defendant guilty of misapplying money of a corporation and
sentencing defendant to an indeterminate term of not less
than one nor more than ten years in the State Prison. The
defendant will be hereinafter referred to as the appellant,
and the plaintiff will be hereinafter referred to as the respondent.
The appellant was charged by information as follows:
"WILBUR J. STITES, alias Webb Stites and alias W.
J. Stites, having heretofore been duly committed to
this court by Jesse P. Rich, a Committing Magistrate
within and for the County of Cache, State of Utah
to answer to this charge, is accused by Curtis E.
Calderwood, District Attorney of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah by this Information of
the crime of misapplying money of a corporation, a
felony as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of December,
1954 at the County of Cache, State of Utah, the said
defendant did then and there as a director and an
officer of a corporation of Valley Motor Company,
a Utah Corporation wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply money of the said corporation in the
amount of $2,000.00 which he had received from
Robert S. Budge which was the property of the said
corporation, contrary to the provisions of the statute
of the State aforesaid in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State
of Utah. Dated this 14th day of June, 1955."
2
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The appellant filed a motion to quash for the reason
alleged that the information did not charge the defendant
with the commission of an offense (R. 2), which motion was
denied by the court. Thereupon the appellant entered a plea
of "not guilty" And the cause was set for jury trial July 20,
1955.
The jury was duly selected and the trial began on July
20,1955.
All of the evidence presented at the trial was offered
by witnesses called by the respondent, excepting the testimony of Attorney George Preston, called by the appellant.
BACKGROUND OF CORPORATE ORGANIZATION
AND CONTROL
The Valley Motor Company was issued a certificate of
incorporation by the State of Utah, January 8, 1954 (PI Exhibit No. 2). The total authorized capital stock of the corporation was 1000 shares at a par value of $100.00 each of
which the incorporators subscribed as follows (PI Exhibit
No.3):
Wilbur J. Stites
Gene Smart
Dean J. Rogers
Seth S. Allen
Zachary T. Champlin

596
1
1
1
1

shares
share
share
share
share

All of the aforesaid incorporators except, Zachary T.
Champlin, were named in the Articles of Incorporation as
the first board of directors, with the appellant, Wilbur J.
Stites named as president, Dean Rogers as Vice President
and Gene Smart as Secretary-Treasurer (PI Exhibit No. 3).

3
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The incorporators and Board of Directors each held
one meeting, both held on January 18, 1954, at the office of
Valley Motor Company, Logan, Utah, the incorporator's
meeting being at 8:00 o'clock p.m. and the board meeting
at 9:00 o'clock p.m. (R. 49). No other meetings were held
during the year 1954 (R. 38 and 39).
At these meetings, Mr. Champlin, the attorney who
drafted the articles of incorporation, presented certain matters to the incorporators and directors in the form of recommended by-laws (R. 42 and 43) but the minutes as subsequently typed were never approved by the Board nor were
they ever signed (R. 43) and the original notes taken at the
meeting could not be found (R. 50). The purported minutes
were offered by the respondent to show that the First
National Bank of Logan was the bank at which company
funds were to be deposited, but Mr. Champlin admitted this
was done because the bank required a resolution authorizing
the depository (R. 42). Upon objection of appellant to introduction of the purported minutes, a discussion before the
jury transpired between the trial judge and counsel for the
parties (R. 56 and 57) and the judge sustained the objection
upon admission of the appellant that the First National
Bank was desigated as a depository, though not a mandatorily exclusive depository. However, subsequently (R. 120)
the respondent again offered the minutes in evidence and the
court admitted the same over objection of appellant with the
following comment: (R. 120)
"Under the circumstances the book is received, but,
gentlemen, the court is not characterizing the book
as a stockholders' book or minute book. It's some
papers with writing on them, unsigned. So for what
it's worth, it's received."
4
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Mr. Champlin, one of the incorporators, testified that
he paid $10.00 on the one share to which he had subscribed
(R. 43) and added that he paid the remainder in services,
although he never did bill the company for such services and
had been paid $390.00 cash (R. 29) and had never filed any
claim for more; that he signed as an incorporator because the
law requires five incorporators; that the incorporators other
than Stites subscribed to one share each (R. 44 and 45).
The corporation was organized to be run by appellant
(R. 133). Appellant and Wayne Craw, Jay Howell and Clair
Lundberg each advanced $6,000.00 to the corporation to
commence business and no other cash was advanced by
any other parties (R. 135). Howell (R. 133), Craw (R. 114)
and Lundberg (R. 106) advanced said $6,000.00 each as a
loan and were creditors of the corporation; however, they
had a side agreement with appellant that Craw, Howell and
Lundberg would be employed by the company at a fixed salary of $500.00 per month, each, and that Stites would
draw a higher salary and make equalization payments
on the side to the other three from Stites own salary
(Howell R. 104) (Craw R. 113 and 114). The board of
Directors named in the articles, as such, did not undertake to direct the affairs of the company, and in fact Rogers
and Allen knew very little, if anything about the automobile
business, and the management and direction of the company
was left solely to appellant (Lundberg R. 137 line 13; Britzell R. 87).
In addition to the side payments to Lundberg, Craw and
Howell, the appellant was to make payments from his personal account after drawings from the corporation, upon a
$6,000.00 note to Gene Smart (R. 87-88) and upon a $25,000
note to W. W. Lundberg for auto parts (R. 135 and 136).

5
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TRANSACTION WHICH WAS SUBJECT OF CHARGE
Dr. RobertS. Budge testified that on December 3, 1954
he purchased a Buick Riviera, 1955, from Valley Motor Company (R. 62). Dr. Budge traded a 1951 Studebaker for the
Buick and agreed to pay $2000.00 in cash additional. This
$2000.00 additional cash was paid by check as appears from
Plaintiff's Exhibit #4, substantially, as follows:
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH
Pay to the order of

Smithfield, Utah, 2 Dec - 1954
WEBB STITES ____________ $2,000.00

Two Thousand and No/100 ------------------------------------Dollars
s/ Robert S. Budge
This check was given by Dr. Budge to appellant (R. 63).
The indorsement on the back of the check was: "Webb Stites
for deposit only" (PI Exhibit 4), and was deposited to the
personal account of appellant in the Logan Branch of First
Security Bank. (R. 67-68) .
REVIEW OF EVIDENCE OF PURPORTED
MISAPPLICATION
Don Britzell, bookkeeper and office manager of Valley
Motor Co. testified that he was employed by "Webb Stites
and Valley Motor Company" (R. 69); that the Buick automobile purchased by Budge was the property of Valley
Motor Co., and that the records and books which Britzell
kept showed a balance due and owing to Valley Motor Co.
of $2000.00 by Dr. Budge (R. 73-76); that there is no
record of the receipt of $2000.00 by Valley Motor Co. from
Dr. Budge (R. 77). Under cross examination (R. 79) Britzell
admitted that the records would show nothing other than

6
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what was placed in the records by Britzell or the office girl
under Britzell's direction. Britzell, when first confronted
with the matter as to whether Britzell had been directed
by appellant to charge the $2000.00 against appellant's account, hedged as follows (R. 79-81):
Q Now, Mr. Britzell, don't you recall that Mr. Stites
told you to charge that $2,000 to his account?
A Not directly.
Q But you remember a discussion of that, don't
you?
A I do. He might have beenQ But you didn't charge it to his account, did you?
A No.
Q And you still haven't done so?
A I couldn't charge it to his account as long as
there was an outstanding contract to Robert Budge.
Q Didn't he tell you to charge it to his account?
A Not that I remember of directly, no.
Q Haven't you told some other persons that's what
he told you to do?
A I have not.
Q You haven't told anybody?
A Not that he told me to charge it directly to him.
Q Have you discussed this matter with the receiver.
A With the receiver?
Q Yes.
A No.
Q Well, what do you recall he told you?
A He just said, "Charge it." That's all he said, as
I remember. Of course, we were doing a lot of other
things that same evening, and he might have meant
charge it to him.
Q You don't know what he meant?
A I don't really, no.

7
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Q But you do remember his saying to charge it?
A That's right.
Q And you don't remember telling some other
people that he had told you to charge it to his account?
A No.
Q But you know it's likely that that's what he intended to do, don't you?
A He may have done.
MR. CALDERWOOD: I object to that as a
conclusion of the witness, and I object to the forrh of
the question.
THE COURT: On cross examination it's all
right. I'll take the answer.
Q Is that right?
A It could be, yes.
Q Now there had been a number of charges made to
the account of Webb Stites on his personal account.
He had an account in the files just like this didn't he?
A At times.
Q And you made various charges to his account
there, didn't you?
A I did.
Q And some of them were in connection with automobiles, weren't they?
A They were.
Q So that there were other transactions that were
charged to his account that was coming to the business; is that right?
A That's right.
Q And there were some checks that were made to
his account deposited to his account; he paid some
company business by his own checks; isn't that
right?
A Indirectly, yes.
8
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Q But he did pay them?
A Yes.
Q And there were some payments being made to
persons for parts and so forth for the benefit of the
company that were paid out of his personal account;
isn't that right?
A Directly I would say yes.
Q And they remained as charges against his account, didn't they?
A That's right.
Q And at the end of the year or sometime, it was
supposed to be reconciled; isn't that right?
A That's right.
Nevertheless, Britzell said he made the charge against
Budge instead of Stites (R. 82 lines 14-19). Britzell was recalled (R. 153) and when asked when he was first informed
to charge the $2,000.00 to Stites account, said he never knew
it was to be charged to Stites account (R. 154 line 4); however} when confronted with a memorandum in Britzelfs own
handwriting which showed the names on a number of contracts} Britzell admitted that he made a notation opposite
the name of Robert Budge} ((Charge Webb}} (R. 154). On
further redirect examination (R. 154-155) Britzell said he
made the notation sometime in January} 1955J possibly on
January 10, 1955.

John Clay, a certified public accountant who was employed by respondent to examine the books of Valley Motor
Company (R. 89) testified that the books showed the purchase of the car by Valley Motor Company and its subsequent sale to Robert Budge but the books did not show
any credit of $2,000.00 to the Budge contract. Clay testified
that from examination of the books it would apear that
Stites owed the company by January 1955 the sum of
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$70,017.15 (R. 92) and that as of October 1, 1955, it appeared from the books that Stites owed the company
$45,849.76 (R. 95); however he admitted that he would not
have credited Stites except for what the books showed. The
cash receipts journal and many of the side payments from
Stites account on company obligations would not be credited
in the books (R. 96). Britzell, the bookkeeper, when shown
the ledger sheet prepared by him showing the account of
Stites up to October 16, admitted that the ledger sheet
showed Stites owing only $17,000.00 as of October 16, 1954
(R. 118), as compared with the $45,849.76 figure which Clay
found from examining the same books.
Over objection of appellant the court permitted Clair
Lundberg (R. 99-104) and Wayne Craw (R. 109-111), employees of Valley Motor Company and persons with whom
appellant was by agreement to divide his increased salary
and allowances, to testify concerning a purported conversation which was said to have transpired in January 1955, in
the upper room of Valley Motor Company between Clair
Lundberg, Jay Howell, Wayne Craw and the appellant
Lundberg testified that he asked appellant "What did you do
with the $2,000.00 from Bob Budge?" to which the appellant
replied "I took that to cover another fictitious deal" (R. 104)
and didn't know whether it was a fictitious deal being covered for the corporation or other persons (R. 107).
At the conclusion of the testimony of Wayne Craw (R.
120), the respondent rested and the appellant moved to dismiss the information for the reason that there had not been
presented sufficient facts to prove the commission of the
offense charged, which motion was argued at length by appellant and denied by the court.
10
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Over objection of appellant the respondent was permitted to reopen its case (R. 122), and presented Jay Howell as
a witness to testify, over objection of appellant, further concerning the conversation relative to the "fictitious deal"
which was previously testified to by Clair Lundberg and
Wayne Craw. The following transpired beginning at (R.
123 Line 30) :

Q Was this conversation with Mr. Stites- where
did it take place?
A In the upper room previously mentioned by Clair
Lundberg and Wayne Craw.
Q And that's in the office of the Valley Motor Company?
A It's the upstairs of the Valley Motor Company.
Q And could you fix the date of that conversation?
A That would have been approximately four o'clock
in the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1954.
Q Nineteen fifty-four?
A Yes. Or 1955, I beg your pardon.
Q Now with the conversation, did Mr. Stites discuss
the matter with you freely and voluntarily?
A He did.
Q Was there any coercion or intimidation on your
part?
A None.
Q Was anyone in the room armed?
A Yes.
Q. Who was armed?
A Mr. Stites.
Q Now without11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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MR. FADEL: Now I object, your honor, and
move that the answer be stricken, and I move at this
time for a mistrial, and I think that this was completely planned by the district attorney and this witness, and I think that there was no foundation or any
reason why that matter should have been mentioned
here, and I move at this time for a new trial.
THE COURT: The answer is stricken and the
jury is instructed to disregard it. I didn't know we
were going to get an answer like that. The motion for
a mistrial is denied and the motion for a new trial is
denied. The jury will disregard the answer.
A discussion in chambers followed (R. 125-130), in
which the court indicated that mere possession of a firearm
is not proof in connection with misapplication of funds (R.
127), without a showing that the appellant was summoned
to a meeting of the board of directors to account for the
funds (R. 128). When proceedings resumed in open court,
the respondent endeavored to lay a foundation to show that
appellant had been summoned before the board to account,
but no such answers were forthcoming (R. 131) and the
matter of the gun was dropped. However, over the objection
of the appellant, Howell was permitted to testify regarding
purported conversations he had with appellant in which appellant was supposed to have explained a money shortage
by saying "We've made some poor deals" and "I've used the
money'' (R. 132); ''I used it to take and pay people off down
in California" (R. 133) but no evidence was presented as to
what people or for what reasons payment was made.
When the respondent rested the second time, appellant
renewed his motion to dismiss, which was denied by the
court.
12
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Appellant called only one witness, Attorney George
Preston who is the attorney for Wayne Craw, the receiver
appointed for Valley Motor Company (R. 156). Preston testified that he recalled having told appellant's attorney that
Preston saw a sales slip with a notation on it of the turn-in
value of the Budge automobile and $2,000.00 cash and the
notation was believed to be in the handwriting of appellant. However, Preston testified that he must have been mistaken when he told appellant's attorney of the notation that
Stites had made showing that Budge had paid $2,000.00 cash
(R. 157), but that Preston did tell appellant's attorney that
he had seen such a notation (R. 158-159).
The instructions were discussed by counsel and the court
and exceptions notes. The court instructed the jury with
written instructions. Arguments were made to jury and a
verdict of guilty was returned.
Appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment (R. 15)
and a motion for a new trial (R. 16) which motions were
denied by the court. The motion in arrest of judgment was as
follows:
"Defendant respectfully moves the court to enter an order in arrest of judgment so that no judgment be rendered upon the verdict of guilty, for the
reason that the facts proved to not constitute a public offense.
This motion is made pursuant to the provisions
of Title 77, Chapter 34, Section 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Dated this 23rd day of July, 1955."
The motion for a new trial was as follows:
13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Defendant respectfully requests the court for
an order granting a new trial in this cause for reasons as follows:
1. The verdict is contrary to the evidence.
2.

The verdict is contrary to the law.

3. The court erred in admitting the testimony
of Clair Lundberg, Wayne Craw and Jay Howell
relative to conversations of each witness with the defendant concerning the $2,000.00 which is the subject
of the charge.
4. The court should have declared a mistrial
and ordered a new trial after Jay Howell testified
that the Defendant was the only one armed during
the conversation in the upper room of the Valley
Motor Co.
5. The court misdirected the jury in the matters of law as excepted to by the defendant in noting
exceptions to instructions.
This motion is made pursuant to the provisions
of Title 77, Chapter 38, Section 3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Dated this 23 day of July, 1955."

14
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN MOTION TO QUASH INFORMATION.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS
OF APPELLANT FOR DISMISSAL AND IN ARREST OF
JUDGMENT.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION
OF APPELLANT TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL AND
GRANT A NEW TRIAL UPON TESTIMONY THAT APPELLANT WAS ARMED.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING CRAW, HOWELL & LUNDBERG TO TESTIFY CONCERNING CONVERSATION WITH ACCUSED.
POINTV.
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT ONE, THE MINUTE
BOOK.
POINT VI.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO
THE JURY.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN MOTION TO QUASH INFORMATION.
The appellant moved to quash the information for the
reason that it did not charge the defendant with the commission of an offense (R. 2). The information did not specify
any statue which was the basis of the charge, but merely
charged the misapplication of money of a corporation as set
forth in the statement of facts (Supra p. 2). The Utah Code
of Criminal Procedure, 77-21-8, provides as follows:
"77-21-8. Charging the offense. - (1) The
information or indictment may charge, and is valid
and sufficient if it charges the offense for which the
defendant is being prosecuted in one or more of the
following ways:
(a) By using the name given to the offense by
the common law or by a statue.
(b) By stating so much of the definition of the
offense, either in terms of the common law or of the
statute defining the offense or in terms of substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give the
court and the defendant notice of what offense is intended to be charged.
(2) The information or indictment may refer
to a section or subsection of any statute creating the
offense charged therein, and in determining the
validity or sufficiency of such information or indictment regard shall be had to such reference."
The portion of the statute applicable to the instant case
is subdivision (b). The definition of the offense of misapplying corporate funds is neither defined by statute nor by
common law. Where the statute creating the offense defines
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it by use of precise words and designates and specifies particular acts or means whereby the offense may be committed,
the language of the statute may be sufficient; but where
particular acts or facts are not specified by statute and many
things may be done which constitute the offense, it is necessary in charging the offense to set forth particular things or
acts charged to have been done with reasonable certainty
and distinctness so that the defendant can make his defense
and protect himself after judgment against another prosecution for the same offense.
In the case of State v. Jopham, 41 U 39, 123 Pac. 888,
Justice Straup, fully discussed this proposition in a lengthy
opinion. The defendant was convicted of the crime of pandering and sentenced to a term of eighteen years. The information charged that the defendant "did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, by promises and threats, and by
divers devices and schemes, cause, induce, persuade and encourage" a particularly named female, "being then and
there an inmate of a certain house of prostitution, to remain
therein as such inmate; such house of prostitution being then
and there known as No. 140 in what is commonly known as
the stockade in Salt Lake City."

A demurrer to the information was denied. This court
at page 42 stated:
"The doctrine is fundamental, and, as stated by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Rosen v.
United States, 161 U.S. 29, 16 Sup. Ct. 434, 40 L. Ed.
606, that "the constitutional right of a defendant to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him entitles him to insist, at the outset,
by demurrer or by motion to quash, and after verdict, by motion in arrest of judgment, that the indict-

17
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ment shall apprise him of the crime charged with
such reasonable certainty that he can make his defense and protect himself after judgment against
another prosecution for the same offense;" and by
Mr. Justice Sanborn in Floren v. United States, 186
Fed. 961, 108 C.C.A. 577, that:
"'On a motion in arrest of judgment, as well
as on a demurrer, it is essential to the validity of an
indictment that it contain averments of the facts
which constitute the offense it charges so certain and
specific that upon conviction or acquittal thereon it,
and the judgment upon it, will constitute a complete
defense to a second prosecution of the defendant for
the same offense."'
"It is also elementary and, as stated by the
Michigan court in People v. Marion, 28 Mich. 257, approved and quoted by this court in State v. McKenna,
24, Utah, 317, 67 Pac. 815, that, 'as every man is presumed innocent until proved to be guilty, he must be
presumed also to be ignorant of what is intended to
be proved against him, except as he is informed by
the indictment or information."'

At page 44, this court held:
"The same thought is expressed by Mr. Justice
Frick in the case of State v. Swan, 31 Utah, 336, 88
Pac. 12, that,
"'Where an act denounced by the statute is
couched in generic terms, the information must go
further in stating the offense than be merely using
the language of the statute,' and that an information
in such language is not sufficient 'in those cases
where the acts constituting the offense are nearly
as varied as the number of cases in which the charge
is made.'"
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This court goes on to state in its analysis on pages 46,
47 and 48, that the physical acts claimed to have been done
by defendant should be alleged; that
"Should one assert to another that he had a
'device or scheme' to accomplish a particular result,
would that 'in ordinary and concise language enable
a person of ordinary understanding to know what
was intended' or meant? To enable such a person to
know what was intended, would not the first question necessarily be, 'What is the device or scheme?';
that
"When the defendant was charged that she had
'by divers devices and schemes' accomplish a particular result, who but the pleader knew what was intended or expected to be proved against her in such
respect? Or, if it should be claimed that she by
'threats' had accomplished such result, again, who
but the pleader could know with reasonable certainty
what menacing act or conduct of hurt or fear or
threatening menace to inflict pain or punishment
or injury to person, reputation or property, or torestrain freedom of action, was intended or expected to
be proved? Should one complain of another that he
'threatened' him, would not again the first question
necessarily be, in order to 'enable a person of common understanding to know' what was meant or intended, 'What did he say or do?' And, if it should be
claimed that the defendant by 'promises' had accomplished such result, again, could any one but the
pleader know with reasonable certainty just what
particular acts or conduct in that regard was intended or expected to be proved?"; that
"As the accused 'must be presumed ignorant of
what is intended to be proved against him except as
he is informed by the information or indictment,' it
is essential that the information or indictment, not
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the evidence, apprise him with reasonable certainty
what is intended or expected to be proved, and what
he is required to meet and defend. And, as repeatedly
stated by the courts, the acts constituting the offense,
and the particular circwnstances of the offense, when
they are necessary to constitute a complete offense,
are required to be stated in the information, so that
the court may determine whether the acts and conduct complained of constitute a violation of statute.
It surely cannot be contended that the determination
of such a question is alone for the jury, and that it
is at liberty to regard anything a promise, anything
a threat, anything a device, anything a scheme.
Should one either in a civil or criminal pleading
charge another at a specified time and place 'with
having cheated and defrauded' him, without alleging
the acts, the conduct, the facts constituting the cheat
or fraud, certainly no one would contend that to be a
sufficient pleading to withstand a demurrer. What
more has been done here? The pleader has stated his
conclusion that the defendant has said or done something, that she has been guilty of some kind of conduct, or committed acts of some kind, which in his
opinion amount to a promise or a threat or a device
or a scheme, but withheld from the court and the defendant a statement of any acts committed, or things
said or done, by her, or any facts or circumstances
from which it may be determined whether in law a
promise or threat was made, or a device or scheme
used or employed, by her. The acts and conduct of
the defendant, and the facts and circumstances constituting the promise, the threat, the device, the
scheme, were required to be alleged in the information, so that the court could judge whether the accused should have been put upon trial, and that she
might then know what she was to defend against."
The court cites the following cases:
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United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 8 Sup. Ct. 571:
"In the United States v. Hess, supra, and in the
federal cases just cited, it was held that an indictment based on and in the language of the statute
directed against 'devising or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud,' to be affected by communication through the post office, must not only
allege that the person did devise a scheme or artifice
to defraud, but it must be set out clearly and distinctly what that artifice was, wherein the fraud consisted, the facts and circumstances by which it was
to be accomplished, the facts which constitute the
specific scheme or artifice so devised by the defendant, and that this must be done, not inferentially, but
by direct and positive averments."
People v. Neil, 91 Cal 465, 27 Pac 763:
"In People v. Neil, supra, it was held that an
information charging that the defendant 'fraudulently voted at an election when he was not entitled
to vote,' though in the language of the statute, is not
sufficient to state an offense, but must set forth the
facts relied on to show fraudulent voting and the
particular fact or facts showing that the defendant
was not entitled to vote."
State v. Farmer, 104 N.C. 887, 10 SE 563:
"In State v. Farmer, supra, it was held that an
indictment against a physician, in the language of
the statute for giving a false and fraudulent prescription for liquors, must set out not only that the
prescription was either false or fraudulent, but also
the facts and particulars constituting the falsity
or fraud.''
The court held further at page 54 that an information
wanting in any essentials cannot be helped by the evidence
or verdict.
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The conclusion arrived at by this court was as follows:
"The conclusion reached holding the information
defective in the particulars stated not only works a
reversal of the judgment but a discharge of the defendant. We have a statute (C.L. 1907, section 4694)
which provides that 'an information may be amended
in matter of substance or form at any time before
the defendant pleads, without leave of court. The
information may be amended at any time thereafter
and on the trial as to all matters of form, at the
discretion of the court, where the same can be done
without leave of court. The information may be
amended at any time thereafter and on the trial as
to all matters of form, at the discretion of the court,
where the same can be done without prejudice to
the rights of the defendant.' An amendment supplying proper allegations and curing the defects of
this information is matter of substance, not form.
The particular defects were, before plea, specifically
pointed out by the special demurrer. The undoubted
right to amend the information in respect to the
particulars wherein it is defective then existed. Instead of amending it, when an amendment was permissible, the hazard of a trial and a conviction on
a bad information was taken. The right to now
amend is lost. The statute, whether wisely or unwisely, forbids it.
The order therefore is that the judgment of the
court below be reversed, and the case remanded to
the district court, with directions to discharge the
defendant."
The information in the instant case in no way specified
the acts by which it was claimed the appellant "wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously" misapplied the money of the corporation. There is no allegation as to what, in fact, the appellant did with the money; what he should have done with
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· it; what authority or direction required appellant to apply
money and if so in what way and to what purpose. The appellant had no way of knowing whether by this information
he was going to have to prove a complete accounting between himself and the corporation, creditors of the corporation and others; whether it was claimed to be improper for
appellant to have a personal account with the corporation;
whether it was improper to comingle funds of his own with
the corporation; whether it was improper to make payments
and dealings from his own account for corporate purposes;
whether his acts were fraudulent as to stockholders or creditors, and if so, what acts were fraudulent and in what
particulars was anyone defrauded. There is no allegation
of what section or sections of the statute prohibit any of the
acts claimed to have been done by appellant.
In the case of State v. Spencer 101 U 274, 117 P 2d
455, denying hearing 101 U 287, 121 P 2d 912, the information accused the defendant
"of the crime of Perjury, committed as follows, to
wit: That the said Sid K. Spencer, on the 31st day of
May, A.D., 1939, at the County of Salt Lake, State
of Utah, committed perjury, by testifying as follows:
"'I have not driven a car at any time since my
license was revoked for drunken driving' contrary to
the provisions of the statute. * * *"
This court held that the information did not charge a
crime under the requirements of subdivision (b) of 77-21-8,
and remanded the cause for dismissal, since there had been
no specification of the degree of perjury nor any particulars
specifying the degree; nor does a bill of particulars supply
any defect in an information.
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The ruling of this court in State v. Jopham (supra)
was quoted and followed by the Supreme Court of Idaho in
State v. Groseclose, 171 P2d 863 (1946) wherein they held
a charge permitting cattle at large in the words of the
statute, "without proper care and attention" was insufficient
without additional averments clearly setting forth all of the
elements and acts which constituted the crime charged

It would seem that the requirements of alleging fraud
and misapplication in criminal cases would be even greater
than that required in civil cases which requires that in all
averments of fraud the circumstances constituting fraud
shall be stated with particularity (Rule 9 (b) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure) . Especially should this be true since neither
criminal fraud nor misapplication are defined by statute.
The United States Supreme Court in the case of United
States v. James H. Britton, 107 U.S. 655, 27 L. Ed 520, Sup.
Ct. 512, where a bank president was charged with over 100
counts in connection with his use of bank funds, the court in
holding the counts relative to misapplication of corporate
funds insufficient stated:
"We think the willful misapplication made an
offense by this statute means, a misapplication for
the use, benefit or gain of the party charged, or of
some company or person other than the association.
Therefore, to constitute the offense of willful misapplication, there must be a conversion to his own use
or the use of some one else, of the moneys and funds
of the association by the party charged. This essential element of the offense is not averred in the
counts under consideration, but is negatived by the
averment that the shares purchased by the defendant were held by him in trust for the use of the
association, and there is no averment of a conversion
by the defendant to his own use or the use of any
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other person, of the funds used in the purchase of
the shares. The counts, therefore, charge maladministration of the affairs of the bank, rather than
criminal misapplication of the funds.
If we hold these counts to be good, then every
official act of an officer, clerk or agent of a bank
association, by which its funds are applied in a way
not authorized by law, would be punishable under
section 5209."

"The words 'willfully misapplied' are, so far as
we know, new in statutes creating offenses, and they
are not used in describing any offense at common
law. They have no settled technical meaning like the
words 'embezzle,' as used in the statutes, or the
words 'steal, take and carry away,' as used in common law. They do not, therefore, of themselves fully
and clearly set forth every element of the offense
charged. It would not be sufficient simply to aver
that the defendant 'willfully misapplied' the funds of
the association. This is well settled by the authorities we have already cited. There must be averments
to show how the application was made, and that it
was an unlawful one. These everments the pleader
has in these counts attempted to make by charging
that the defendant paid out the funds of the association in the purchase of its own stock. But this is
not, necessarily, an unlawful use of the funds of the
association. It is not every purchase of its own shares
by an association that is forbidden."
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS
OF APPELLANT FOR DISMISSAL AND IN ARREST OF
JUDGMENT.
The appellant moved for dismissal of the information at
the close of the respondent's case (R. 121) and again when
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the respondent rested after being permitted to reopen its
case. Appellant also moved the court to arrest judgment
( R. 15) . Since these motions concern the sufficiency of the
evidence to prove the commission of a public offense, they
will be considered together at this point.
To sustain a conviction for misapplication of corporate
funds requires proof of unauthorized, unlawful acts performed with fraudulent intent to defraud corporate stockholders. The case of UNITED STATES v. Matot, 146 F2d 197
(1944) in construing 12 USCA Section 592 which is similar
to 76-13-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, held that the words
"wilfully misapplies" requires a proof of fraudulent intent,
stating:
"We read the words 'with intent in any case to
injure or defraud such Federal Reserve Bank' as
limiting all of Section 592 that goes before; that is,
as not confined to making false entries. Perhaps that
construction is unnecessary, for 'wilful misapplication' of money presupposes fraudulent intent, as does
'embezzlement'; and although 'abstraction' standing
alone might perhaps be read otherwise, the context
forbids. Indeed, the prosecution itself concedes that
it was obliged to prove fraudulent intent"
The only Utah case on corporate frauds found by appellant is that of State v. Pritchett 87 U 104, 34 P2d 704,
rehearing 87 U 109, 48 P2d 451, where the office manager
of Utah Poultry Producers Co-operative Association was
charged with "wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently" misapplying the credit of the corporation, and the
only question considered was the sufficiency of the charge
upon demurrer thereto. The merits were not considered.
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In the instant case the evidence was lacking in many
particulars. Proof of misapplication would seem to require
the existence of someone in authority over the appellant
who could specify the manner of application of the funds and
to establish a rule of conduct, the violation of which, would
be a misapplication. However as set forth in the statement of
facts (Supra 3-4) in considering the background of corporate organization and control, the Valley Motor Company
was essentially on "one-man" corporation; there were no
directors meetings after business commenced in January,
1954, and none of the directors other than appellant purported to understand, manage or direct the business. There was
no proof that Appellant was without authority to establish a
personal account with the corporation or to handle the business and funds as he desired. There were many charges being made to the account of appellant in connection with side
obligations of the corporation (R. 81) and the account was
to be reconciled at the end of the year. There was no attempt
by appellant to conceal any of the transactions in that these
transactions were recorded in the books and accounts of the
corporation. The certified public accountant, John Clay,
testified (R. 95) that any capable man could examine the
books of Valley Motor Co. and reconstruct the charges
against the account of appellant, but in figuring the credits
due appellant, he, of course, would not be able to establish
the amount of credit due appellant for side obligations paid
by appellant (R. 96).
Throughout the entire trial, witnesses for respondent
testified that the appellant had never directed that the
$2,000.00 in question be charged to appellant's account, until
near the end of the trial (R. 154-155) Britzell, the bookeeper
reluctantly admitted that Britzell had made a memorandum
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about January 10, 1955, to charge appellant for this $2000.00,
although Britzell previously (R. 154, line 4) had denied
that he ever knew the charge was to be made against appellant's account.
The $2,000.00 check (Plaintiff's Exh. 4) was made payable to the account of appellant. There was no evidence as to
why the check was drawn payable to appellant personally,
although Dr. Budge did testify that he gave the check in
payment for the balance due on the Buick automobile. The
check being made payable to appellant, he cannot be said
to have misapplied the check by depositing it to his own account. This case resolves itself to a matter of accounting between appellant and the corporation. There is no evidence
that an accounting was made nor evidence as to a demand
for settlement of an account, nor the time within which an
accounting would be required, and if required, who had the
authority to require the accounting.
There was no evidence of any fraudulent intent upon
the part of appellant in the manner in which he dealt with
the $2,000.00. The bookkeeper finally admitted that he was
instructed by the appellant to charge the $2,000.00 against
account of appellant. Then as to what was done with the
$2,000.00 the trial court permitted the three persons, Craw,
Howell and Lundberg who were receiving "side payments"
from appellant to testify that appellant told these three persons that appellant had used the money to cover another
"fictitious deal." However no explanation or proof \Yas offered as to what constituted a fictitious deal or whether the
covering of the fictitious deal was for the benefit of the corporation or other persons (R. 104 and 107). These very persons who testified to the "fictitious deal" conversation were
receiving corporate money in apparent good conscience
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through appellant, as side payments in addition to their regular salary under a gentlemen's agreement (R. 114 and 134)
although these three were creditors of the corporation in the
sum of $6,000.00 each for capital loans at the outset of business in January, 1954. They all knew that the company was
underfinanced.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION
OF APPELLANT TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL AND
GRANT A NEW TRIAL UPON TESTIMONY THAT APPELLANT WAS ARMED.
In the statement of facts (ante 11-12) the entire incident which is the subject of Point III is set forth. Clair
Lundberg (R. 99-104) and Wayne Craw (109-111) had already testified over objection of appellant to the "fictitious
deal" conversation without any mention of weapons. Then
the respondent reopened its case and over objection of appellant called Jay, Howell apparently, to further testify concerning this same conversation. The particular questions
and answers were (R. 124).

Q Was there any coercion or intimidation on your
part?
A None.
Q Was anyone in the room armed?
A Yes.
Q Who was armed?
A Mr. Stites.
At this point appellant objected and moved for mistrial. The court ordered the answer stricken and instructed
the jury to disregard it, but denied the motion for mistrial
and new trial. In chambers district attorney contended that
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he intended to show by the testimony that the appellant
couldn't have been intimidated because the appellant was
armed (R. 123 to 126), but this question about arms was
wholly uncalled for since the immediately previous question
and answer were: (R. 123 line 11)
Now in that conversation, did Mr. Stites discuss
the matter with you freely and voluntarily?
A He did.

Q

The very foundation questioning negatived the inclination
of appellant to use force even if he did have a weapon. The
only purpose the question and answer could serve would
be that of misleading the jury into the belief that appellant
was in possession of the gun with criminal intent. The gun
had nothing to do with this charge in any way and the district attorney was unable to lay any foundation which would
permit further inquiry into the matter of the possession of
the weapon (R. 131) and the matter was dropped. Nevertheless, the harm had already been done.
Nothing further could be done or said about the reason
for the weapon being in possession of appellant to erase the
matter from the memory of the jurors without risk of incurring even greater prejudice. The court should have ordered a new trial.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING CRAW, HOWELL & LUNDBERG TO TESTIFY CONCERNING CONVERSATION WITH ACCUSED.
Lundberg (R. 99-104) and Craw (R. 109-111) were
permitted to testify that in conversation with appellant on
about January 18th or 19th, Lundberg asked "What did you
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do with the $2,000.00 from Bob Budge" and the witness
were allowed to testify that appellant answered, "I took
that to cover another fictitious deal." There was no other
evidence of the use of the money by the appellant, so that
if that sj;atement about the fictitious deal amounted to a
confession, it was not admissible without a foundation being
laid to show the same was voluntary and that the accused
was fully apprised of his rights. Furthermore since appellant
was using money of the corporation through his personal
account to make payments on obligations of the corporation
and to Craw, Howell & Lundberg by prearrangement with
Craw, Howell & Lundberg, then if this use of the money was
a misapplication of corporate funds, Craw, Howell & Lundberg are accomplices whose testimony was not corroborated
by any other evidence.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT ONE, THE MINUTE BOOK.
The facts concerning the introduction of the purported
minutes of meeting of the board of directors are set forth
in the Statement of Facts, (supra page 4).
A minute book or other record of a corporation must
be proved to be authentic or its authenticity conceded before
it is admissible as evidence, Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol. 9, Sec. 4622, p. 489).
The original notes taken at the meeting of the board
were taken by Attorney Champlin (R. 41) and he subsequently retyped the notes but the same were never again
submitted to the Board for approval (R. 42) and were never
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signed. Attorney Champlin had prepared the by-laws in advance and some corrections were made, but he did not know
where the sheets containing the changes might be, although
he did have a copy of the first draft without the changes
(R. 50).
The trial court admitted in evidence the minute book
"for what it is worth." The jury may well have considered
this minute book to be worthy evidence of strict organization
and direction of the Board of Directors in its control of the
corporation, whereas in fact no such control or direction
existed, and the defendant himself was in sole control.
POINT VI

THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO
THE JURY.
The appellant's request for instructions No. 3 and 4
were as follows:
No. 3. "If you find from the evidence that the
defendant was not restricted by the directors or
stockholders of the corporation, in handling the
funds of the corporation, then the defendant cannot
be guilty of misapplying the funds of the corporation,
and your verdict should be Not Guilty."
No. 4. "You are instructed that the affairs of
a corporation are managed by its directors and officers for the benefit of the stockholders of the corporation. The statute of the State of Utah which prohibits the unlawful misapplication of corporation
funds by any director or officer of the corporation
was intended to protect the stockholders of the corporation, and if the misapplication of corporate funds
by such directors or officer does not defraud the
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stockholders, the misapplication of funds is not unlawful.''
The court refused to give request No. 3, and modified
No. 4 by striking "for the benefit of the stockholders of the
corporation" from the first sentence, and by adding "or the
creditors, if any," after the word "stockholders" in the last
sentence.
There is no statute making misapplication of corporate
funds a crime which appears to be for the benefit of creditors. 76-13-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
". . . ; and every director . . . who embezzles, abstracts, or wilfully misapplies any of the money,
funds or credits of the corporation or association;
... " is guilty of a felony.
Nothing is stated in the statute which would indicate that
the statute was for the benefit of stockholders or creditors
or both. The only criminal cases reported in Utah, State v.
Pritchett, (Supra 26) did not raise this issue, but that
case involved the many stockholders in the Utah Poultry
Association. The cases in other jurisdictions, mainly Federal, concern misapplication of funds of banking corporations having many stockholders and depositors.
· If the statute were intended for the protection of a credi-

tor of a non-banking corporation, a creditor would then
seem to have control over corporate expenditures even to a
point of controlling the amounts payable to any other creditor at any stated time. There is no greater need to protect a creditor of a corporation from dissipation of corporate
funds than to protect a creditor from dissipation of individual funds; in each case the creditor is assuming the risk
that his debtor may expend business capital without paying
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the creditor, yet a creditor has no criminal recourse to
assist him in the event an individual debtor becomes insolvent irrespective of the reason for the insolvency.
In civil cases the general rule is that a creditor of a
corporation has no right to maintain a personal action
against directors or officers who by their mismanagement
or negligence have committed a wrong against the corporation. The cases annotated in 50 ALR 462 support this proposition. The reasons for the rule are simply stated in Clark
v. Lawrence (1856) Brunner, Col. Cas. 637, Fed. Cas. No.
2,827, 50 ALR 463-4, holding the considerations preventing
suits by creditors against directors to be as follows:
''They are: (1) That the directors are the agents
of the corporation, and not of the creditors, and there
is no legal privity between them. That for misfeasances and nonfeasances in the execution of their
agency whereby their principals are injured, agents
are responsible only to their principals; and that this
rule is as applicable to corporate agents as to agents
of natural persons. (2) An injury done to the capital
of a corporation is not, in contemplation of law, an
injury to each of its creditors. It is true, such injury
may prevent the corporation from paying its debts,
in whole or in part; and a similar injury to an individual may be followed by the same consequence to
his creditors ... "
No where in the penal statutes of Utah does it specifically appear that misapplication of corporate funds which
prevents the corporation from meeting its obligations to
creditors is a crime, and a matter so serious as to constitute
a felony should not be implied from such an indefinite and
uncertain statute especially where such implication extends
the criminal responsibility beyond the scope of civil liability.
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THE APPELLANT DULY EXCEPTED TO THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT:
INSTRUCTION NO. 1. The court had originally drafted
No. 1 (R. 9) to read that to find the defendant guilty, it
would require proof that defendant did ". . . wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously misapply money of said corporation
in the sum of $2,000.00 .... "However, during the course of
instructing the jury, the court deleted the words unlawfully
and feloniously." The information itself charged that the
act was done "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniuosly." United
States v. Matot, supra 26, holds that the charge of "wilful misapplication" requires proof of fraudulent intent as
does embezzlement. United States v. Britton, supra 24,
indicates that there must be proof of unlawful application
of funds in order to prove "wilfull misapplication."
The trial court merely made an inked line through the
words "unlawfully and feloniously" (R. 9) without obliterating these words, thus the jurors in seeing these words
could reasonably conclude that there was no necessity of
finding an unlawful or felonious act.
INSTRUCTION NO. 5. (R. 10) reads as follows:
"You are instructed that a corporation is an
artificial person created by law, a separate and distinct entity from its individual members or stockholders, and this is true even though all its stock is
owned by a single individual."
This may well be a correct statement of law, but its
only application to this case is that of convincing the jury
that even though appellant owned all of the stock he owed
a special duty of faith and protection to a separate entity,
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the corporation, and that his responsibility would be the
same whether there were one or one hundred stockholders.
INSTRUCTION No. 6. (R. 11) is objectionable for similar
reasons advance in connection with the refusal of the court
to instruct the jury upon appellants request for instructions
No.3 and 4, in that the court instructed the jury that if the
act of the appellant was a fraud upon creditors or stockholders it was an unlawful misapplication of funds.
INSTRUCTION No. 7. (R. 11) was as follows:
"The word 'misapply' means to use the Valley
Motor Company funds in a manner and for a purpose
not authorized, to divert funds from rightful purpose
to wrongful purpose, and to use them improperly."
" 'Wilful' means to do the act by design and evil
intent.''
Appellant excepted to this instruction (R. 161) for the
reason that the instruction failed to show by whom authorization should be given. The trial court later interlineated
after the word "authorized," the words "by law" (R. 162).
This instruction was still faulty in that no where were the
jurors informed as to what use of corporate funds was authorized by law. Instruction No. 7 is further faulty in that
either the word "misapply" or the word "wilful" should have
been defined to include "unlawful and felonious" action.
NOTATIONS ON MARGIN OF INSTRUCTIONS.
There are some unusual penciled notations on the margin of the instructions (R. 9, 10, and 11). These may have
been made by one of the jurors, since I trust they were not
made before being presented to the jury, which show the
emphasis placed by the jurors upon certain instructions.
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Most unusual, however, is the penciled comment (R. 10)
with an arrow pointing to instruction No. 4, as follows:
"No evidence of Vally Motor Corp. being credited for $2,000.00 of Robert Budge Check."
This clearly shows that the jury completely ignored
the terstimony of Don Britzell under cross examination
(supra 9) (R. 154) wherein Britzell finally admitted that
he was told by appellant to charge the appellant for the
Robert Budge account.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully urged that:

The information should have been quashed upon motion
of the appellant, and that appellant is entitled to a reversal
of the judgment and discharge.
The motions of the appellant to dismiss and in arrest
of judgment should have been granted, and that the appellant is entitled to a reversal of judgment and discharge.
The trial court erred in its admission of testimony at
trial and in its instructions to the jury for which, if the
judgment is not reversed as above requested, the appellant
is entitled to a new trial.
The jury misconceived and ignored the evidence as is
particularly shown by its penciled notations on the instructions, for which appellant is entitled to a new trial if not released as above requested.
Respectfully submitted,
George K. Fadel
Attorney for Appellant
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